RT Article
T1 Coordination problems in cryptomarkets: changes in cooperation, competition and valuation
JF European journal of criminology
VO 15
IS 4
SP 442
OP 460
A1 Anderdal, Silje
A2 Møller, Kim 1971-
A2 Sandberg, Sveinung 1977-
LA English
YR 2018
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/1580081207
AB The new drug markets emerging on the dark net have reduced earlier drug market risk factors such as visibility and violence. This study uses economic sociology and transaction cost economics to broaden the present understanding of cryptomarkets. Results focus on three coordination problems characterizing illegal markets and how they are alleviated in cryptomarkets. More information and better visibility increase competition, the feedback system enforces cooperation and border control introduces a new cost influencing valuation. Cryptomarkets are formally structured and regulated by rules of conduct and centralized decisions. We argue that the online context circumvents earlier coordination problems in illegal markets, making dark net markets more structurally efficient compared with conventional drug markets.
K1 Cryptomarket
K1 Dark net
K1 Drug market
K1 Economic sociology
K1 Illegal drugs
K1 Transaction cost economics
DO 10.1177/1477370817749177