RT Article
T1 We know where you are, what you are doing and we will catch you: testing deterrence theory in digital drug markets
JF The British journal of criminology
VO 58
IS 2
SP 414
OP 433
A1 Ladegaard, Isak
LA English
YR 2018
UL https://krimdok.uni-tuebingen.de/Record/1574245384
AB Is crime reduced by highly publicized punishment events? Is crime reduced by law enforcement’s public relations work? These longstanding questions are addressed in a novel context—digital drug markets. An analysis of trade data from two large and illegal e-commerce websites, collected on a daily basis for ten months, examined how market revenue was affected by (1) media coverage of police work on such markets and (2) the highly publicized conviction and life-sentencing of a market founder. Trade increased after periods with elevated media coverage, and also after the two court events. Possible explanations for the increase in trade after the trial outcomes are discussed in an analysis of textual conversations in three online forums associated with illegal e-commerce.
K1 Deterrence
K1 Cybercrime
K1 Mass media
K1 Punishment
K1 Drug trade
K1 Illegal markets
K1 Kryptomarkets
K1 Abschreckung
K1 Internetkriminalität
K1 Massenmedien
DO :10.1093/bjc/azx021