We know where you are, what you are doing and we will catch you: testing deterrence theory in digital drug markets

Is crime reduced by highly publicized punishment events? Is crime reduced by law enforcement’s public relations work? These longstanding questions are addressed in a novel context—digital drug markets. An analysis of trade data from two large and illegal e-commerce websites, collected on a daily bas...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Ladegaard, Isak (VerfasserIn)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: 2018
In: The British journal of criminology
Jahr: 2018, Band: 58, Heft: 2, Seiten: 414-433
Online-Zugang: Volltext (Resolving-System)
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Schlagwörter:
Deterrence
Cybercrime
Mass media
Punishment
Drug trade
Illegal markets
Kryptomarkets
Abschreckung
Internetkriminalität
Massenmedien
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Is crime reduced by highly publicized punishment events? Is crime reduced by law enforcement’s public relations work? These longstanding questions are addressed in a novel context—digital drug markets. An analysis of trade data from two large and illegal e-commerce websites, collected on a daily basis for ten months, examined how market revenue was affected by (1) media coverage of police work on such markets and (2) the highly publicized conviction and life-sentencing of a market founder. Trade increased after periods with elevated media coverage, and also after the two court events. Possible explanations for the increase in trade after the trial outcomes are discussed in an analysis of textual conversations in three online forums associated with illegal e-commerce.
ISSN:1464-3529
DOI::10.1093/bjc/azx021